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With the right policy in place, the U.S. sugar market has regained some balance, producer prices have 
recovered from historic lows, and an increasingly efficient domestic sugar-producing industry is 
positioning itself to face a new host of challenges. These challenges include: 
 
•  Reducing costs even further, to cope with declining real prices for sugar. 
 
•  Protecting domestic sugar consumption, which is on an alarmingly and not well-understood 
decline. 
 
•  Achieving a level playing field, free from government intervention, for fair competition with 
foreign producers; meanwhile, preventing subsidized foreign sugar from swamping the U.S. 
market before genuine free trade in sugar can be achieved. 
 
This paper provides views on how the U.S. sugar industry has coped with declining real prices for its 
product; on why the current supply management approach to U.S. policy is the best for American 
taxpayers and sugar producers and consumers; and on the major challenges that lie ahead. 
 
1996 Farm Bill and 1999-2001 Sugar Price Disaster 
 
American sugar producers had been coping with flat nominal prices for sugar throughout the 1980’s and 
1990’s, a particularly painful process during periods of high inflation (Charts 1,2). The overall rate of 
inflation since 1985, the last time there was an increase on the sugar support price, has been 67%. 
 
Flat nominal prices would have been an appealing alternative during 1999 - 2001, when prices 
plummeted to historic lows.  
 
The seeds of sugar’s catastrophic price drop were sown in the 1996 Farm Bill.  That legislation: 
 
1.  Removed acreage limitations on program crops; 
 
2.  Decoupled government payments to farmers from production – effectively enabling farmers to 
collect support on crops they had grown historically, but not necessarily currently. (Sugar 
farmers receive no payments and have not since the 1970’s.) 
 
3.  Suspended the Secretary of Agriculture’s authority to impose sugar marketing allotments – limits 
on the amount of sugar processors may sell, based on the government’s assessment of market 
conditions. 
 Elimination of marketing allotments left the Secretary with only one tool to manage U.S. sugar 
policy and attempt to avoid oversupply, low prices, and sugar loan forfeitures: the tariff-rate 
import quota (TRQ).  The TRQ, though, is a woefully blunt tool.  Commitments made to 40 
countries under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to Mexico under the NAFTA prevent 
reduction of the TRQ much below 1.5 million short tons, about 15 percent of U.S. consumption. 
 
The 1996 Farm Bill provisions had several consequences: 
 
1.  Supplies of most U.S. commodities rose in excess of demand growth and prices fell. 
 
2.  Farmers collected income supports from the government to compensate for the low prices for 
program crops other than sugar, including burgeoning amounts of emergency assistance, based 
on historical production. Without this help, many farmers would have gone out of business.  In 
regions where they could, some farmers shifted acreage into sugarbeets and sugarcane. 
 
3.  With the increased beet and cane acreage and excellent yields, the result of technological 
advances and good weather, sugar production rose in 1998 and 1999. USDA could not reduce 
the TRQ sufficiently to offset the increased production; sugar prices plummeted to 22 year lows 
in 1999 and 2000, well below loan repayment levels; and sugar producers forfeited large 
quantities of sugar to the government for the first time in history. 
 
Increasing Efficiency, Concentration, Vertical Integration 
 
To cope with declining real prices for their product, American sugar farmers have made extraordinary 
adjustments. Just since 1996, 19 sugarbeet or cane processing mills have closed – more a fourth of all 
the mills operating in 1996 (Chart 3).  Some areas have exited the sugar business – portions of Hawaii 
cane and California beets; all of Texas beets – other areas, such as Louisiana cane, have concentrated 
production at the most efficient mills. 
 
Farmers desperate to ensure that facilities will survive to process their sugarbeets and raw cane sugar 
into refined sugar, and to maximize the value added for their product, have integrated vertically at a 
dizzying pace.  As recently as 1999, 37% of the refined sugar sold in the United States was grower 
owned. Currently the grower-owned share of U.S. refined sugar sales nearly double that, at 72% -- the 
cane share has grown from 14% to 59%; the beet share from 65% to 89% (Charts 4-6). 
 
Independent beet processing and cane refining companies that despaired of low refined sugar prices, and 
sought to sell, found no independent buyers. Beet and cane growers, fearing that all their investment in 
growing sugarbeets and growing and processing sugarcane would be lost, organized cooperatively to 
purchase the facilities.   
 
Growers have leveraged themselves mightily to purchase institutions such as Western beet processing 
and Domino cane refining.  With their farm and families’ economic survival on the line, growers’ 
interest in maintaining a stable U.S. sugar market is greater than ever. 
 
2002 Farm Bill and Sugar Price Recovery 
 
Though U.S. sugar production dropped sharply in 2000 and 2001, a consequence of low prices, reduced 
acreage, and mill closures, the U.S. sugar market remained oversupplied, with the government owning 
large quantities of sugar.  Congress, in its wisdom, restored marketing allotment authority to the Secretary of Agriculture in the 2002 Farm Bill, which passed into law last May and went into effect 
October 1, 2002. 
 
The new Farm Bill mandates no-cost operation of a non-recourse loan program, by avoiding sugar loan 
forfeitures. (Sugar processors can satisfy non-recourse loans either by paying off the loan, plus interest, 
or by forfeiting their sugar to the government.) Restoration of the marketing allotments tool far better 
enables the Secretary to balance supply and demand, maintain market prices above forfeiture levels, and 
ensure no-cost policy operation.   
 
Allotments are on unless triggered off.  Allotments are lifted when imports of sugar for domestic food 
use exceed 1.532 million short tons – the WTO minimum of 1.256 million tons, plus up to 276,000 tons 
from Mexico under the NAFTA.   
 
The trigger amount includes not only the sugar TRQ, but also imports of “non-program” sugar – sugar 
imported in blends or products which have no commercial use, but from which sugar is extracted for 
domestic food sales.  The Administration is, thus, under pressure to control these TRQ circumvention 
products. Further increases in the minimum TRQ, through trade negotiations, could trigger off 
marketing allotments, or force an increase in the import trigger level. 
 
In anticipation of marketing allotments, which went into effect last October 1, producer prices 
rebounded from near forfeiture levels during the latter half of 2002.  USDA’s dramatic increase in the 
overall allotment quantity on January 10, 2003, did, however, quell the price rally and reduced prices, 
though fortunately not down to forfeiture danger levels (Charts 7, 8). 
 
Price Ceiling, But Not a Floor 
 
Sugar price behavior in 1999-2000, with prices falling so far below forfeiture levels, sadly reinforced the 
fact that the sugar loan program functions as a price ceiling, but not as a floor.   
 
Only the 10% of sugar production that was forfeited achieved the intended price floor; much of the 2000 
crop was sold at much lower prices.  USDA purchased significant quantities of refined beet sugar for as 
little as 17 cents per pound in 2000, despite a beet sugar loan rate of 22.95 cents per pound.  Processors 
are limited in how much sugar they can forfeit, because of limited storage (processors must store the 
sugar they forfeit) and because of forward contract commitments to customers. 
 
When prices rise, on the other hand, the government increases supplies, through increases in the TRQ or, 
more recently, the overall allotment quantity. The increases in foreign or domestic supplies effectively 
cap the price rise. 
 
Supply Management: The Right Choice for the U.S. Sugar Market 
 
The 1996 Farm Bill, in its “Freedom to Farm” philosophy, removed supply management provisions for 
the program crops and replaced past deficiency payments (the difference between the loan rate and a 
target price) with marketing loan payments and income support payments, decoupled from production, 
that were to be phased down.  Sugar farmers lost marketing allotments and were saddled with 
marketing-assessment and forfeiture-penalty fees, but were not eligible for payments of any kind. 
 
Though the architects of Freedom to Farm expected program-crop production to rise, they expected the 
increased output to be absorbed by rising demand, particularly for exports.  Exports would be fueled by low U.S. prices (facilitated by marketing loan payments that make farmers indifferent to market price 
drops) and by trade liberalization such as the NAFTA (initiated in 1994) and the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA, initiated in 1995).  The government, meanwhile, would phase itself 
out of the American agricultural marketplace.  
 
The actual outcome, of course, was quite to the contrary.  
 
Exports did not rise, but rather fell (Chart 9). Slow foreign economic growth, a strong dollar, and lack of 
compliance with trade agreements were major factors.  Foreign exporting countries were not willing to 
surrender. Importing countries were not willing to open their markets.  Foreign export subsidies and 
monopolistic trading practices continued; many import tariffs rose, rather than fell, and new barriers 
were created. Mexico’s behavior toward imports of U.S. corn and corn sweetener is a prime example. 
 
U.S. commodity prices plummeted and farm income would have plummeted, too, had it not been for an 
unprecedented infusion of government aid. The share of U.S. farm income coming from direct 
government payments shot up from 13% in 1996 to about half in recent years (Charts 10, 11). 
 
Though wholesale sugar prices fell to 22-year lows, and USDA outlays for commodity programs 
exploded from less than $5 billion 1996 to a record of more than $32 billion 2000, American sugar 
farmers received no payments whatsoever.  This helps to explain the many beet and cane mill closures 
and the distress sales of beet processing and cane refining plants. 
 
The cost to the government from sugar loan forfeitures in 2000 has been offset by past marketing-
assessment and forfeiture-penalty fees paid to the government by sugar producers, and by past and 
current sales of government-owned sugar back onto the market, at prices substantially higher than the 
forfeiture values. In fact, U.S. sugar policy has been a net revenue raiser for the U.S. Treasury, of $24 
million, during a period, 1991-2004, when total USDA outlays for all commodities is exceeding $195 
billion (Chart 12). 
 
U.S. Sugar Policy: Anachronistic or Timely? 
 
Sugar is the only major commodity in the 2002 Farm Bill that retains supply management provisions. 
(Marketing orders remain in place for milk and for 32 horticultural products.) Some might refer to 
sugar’s position as outdated. 
 
The rest of agriculture is enjoying unlimited production options and is betting on expanded exports to 
absorb that production. Until new markets open, the rest of agriculture is also relying on massive 
amounts of government income transfers to keep it, and the U.S. rural economy, from collapsing under 
the strain of oversupply and low commodity prices.  
 
Foreign economic growth remains sluggish and the dollar has slid somewhat, but remains strong.  
Despite valiant U.S. efforts in a growing number of trade negotiating arenas, new foreign markets have 
not opened. Indeed, key openings expected from past agreements – China, the EU, Mexico, for example 
– have yet to materialize.   The post-Uruguay WTO round was years delayed in starting and is still likely 
years away from fruition. Unfortunately, U.S. agriculture still cannot rely on export growth.  
 
Meanwhile, the federal budget surplus that fueled the bailout of American agriculture is gone. The 
public’s patience with large transfers to farmers during a period of mounting budget deficits is being 
strained.  
All modern industry uses supply management to match its output with demand. Should agriculture be so 
different?  Absent demand growth and unlimited public funds for income transfers, doesn’t some degree 
of supply management make sense for all of U.S. agriculture? 
 
American sugar farmers earn all their returns from the market, receive no payments from the 
government, and store surpluses at their own expense to stabilize the market.  U.S. sugar policy, 
delivering supply-demand balance, stable prices, and inexpensive sugar to consumers (see below), at no 
cost to U.S. taxpayers, might well be regarded as a model for the rest of U.S. commodity policy, rather 
than as an anachronism. 
 
U.S. Sugar Policy: Benefits to American Consumers 
 
American sugar farmers have long touted the fact that U.S. retail refined sugar prices have been 
remarkably stable, varying insignificantly since the early 1990’s, and are remarkably low relative to 
sugar prices abroad. 
 
We are pleased today to release the results of a new global survey of retail sugar prices, conducted 
independently by the renowned English commodities research firm, LMC International.  LMC surveyed 
retail refined sugar prices in 49 countries, accounting for approximately 80% of world sugar 
consumption (“Retail Prices of Sugar Around the World in 2002,” LMC International Ltd, Oxford, 
England, February 2003.)  
 
LMC has found U.S. consumers in 2002 paid 42 cents per pound of refined sugar, 22% less than the 54-
cent weighted average of other developed countries.  This represents a savings to U.S. consumers of 
$2.4 billion per year, relative to foreign developed-country prices (Charts 13, 14). 
 
Taking varying income levels into account, LMC also found that sugar is more affordable in the United 
States than virtually anywhere else in the world.   
 
•  In terms of minutes of work to purchase a pound of sugar, the United States is third lowest of the 
45 countries LMC studied, both developed and developing.  The U.S. figure of less than two 
minutes is below “free-market” Australia and Canada, less than half the developed-country 
average, only a third of the world average, and 70% below Brazil. Only in Norway and 
Singapore is sugar more affordable (Chart 15). 
 
•  In terms of expenditures on sugar as a percent of per capita income, the United States is the 
lowest in the world – less than half the world and developed-country averages (Chart 16).  In 
their sweetener and sweetened product purchases, American consumers also benefit from the 
availability of low-priced, U.S.-made corn sweetener. 
 
It is also worth noting that U.S. retail sugar prices could have, and probably should have, been lower 
still. U.S. grocery chains chose not to pass along to consumers, but rather retain as increased profits, 
their savings on sharply lower wholesale refined sugar prices over past the several years.   
 
Relative to 1996, average wholesale refined sugar prices – the prices producers receive for the bulk and 
bagged sugar they sell to food manufacturers and grocery chains – were down 8.5% in 1999, 28.8% in 
2000, 20.2% in 2001, and 11.7 % in 2002. Yet retail refined prices never reflected that drop and never declined appreciably during that period. In fact, retail sugar prices actually rose while wholesale prices 
were falling. Retail sugar prices hit a 21-year high in April 2002. 
 
For all of 2002, retail sugar prices averaged 3% higher than in 1996, though producer prices were down 
12% for the same period.  Huge losses for sugar farmers; big profits for the grocery chains. 
 
Likewise, retail prices for sweetened products did not reflect the declining cost of the sugar input. 
Consumer prices for candy, ice cream, cereal, cookies, cakes, and other baked goods rose 7-24% percent 
from 1996 to 2002, while wholesale refined sugar prices were in the doldrums.  The same relationship 
holds up over time. Since 1990, producer prices are down 14%, but retail sugar prices are up 1% and 
sweetened-product prices are up 28-44%  (Charts 17, 18).  
 
We do not object to food manufacturers and retailers from taking advantage of lower costs for sugar and 
other agricultural inputs to increase their profit margins. We do object to the claims made by these 
corporations, and any U.S. sugar policy critics, who lobby for lower sugar prices in order to “help 
consumers.” As the figures inarguably demonstrate, lower producer prices for sugar help food 
manufacturer and retailer profits, but do not help consumers. 
 
U.S. Sugar Policy: Challenges 
 
Though the right U.S. sugar policy is in place, the future economic viability of American sugar farmers 
is far from ensured. A host of challenges lie ahead, including continued cost reductions, protecting 
consumption, and trade issues. 
 
The Cost-Reduction Challenge 
 
American sugar producers who have survived nearly two decades of declining nominal and real prices 
have done so by reducing their costs of production.   
 
Relative to their foreign competition, American sugar producers are among the most efficient. Their 
costs of production are below the world average, and their rank among sugar-producing countries has 
improved steadily.  LMC International ranks U.S. sugar producers 28
th lowest cost of 102 countries – a 
ranking all the more impressive because most of these countries are developing nations, with labor and 
environmental standards, and costs, that are a fraction of the United States’.   Furthermore, the U.S. rank 
has improved steadily over the past two decades (“The LMC Worldwide Survey of Sugar and HFCS 
Production Costs: 2000 Report,” LMC International, Oxford, England, December 2000.) 
 
American producers have achieved extraordinary cost reductions by improving sugar yields in the field 
and the factory, by technological, labor-reducing advances, and by vertical integration to eliminate 
middlemen and maximize efficiencies. Yields of beet sugar per harvested acre are up 20% since the 
early 1980’s and mainland cane sugar yields are up 30%, reflecting larger tonnage of beets and cane in 
the field, higher sugar content in the beets and cane, and increased efficiency at extracting the sugar in 
the factory (Chart 19). Hawaii cane sugar yields per acre have improved about 10% since the early 
1980’s. With its two-year crop, Hawaii’s yields are about triple the mainland U.S. average and, even on 
an annualized basis, are the highest in the world.    
 
Achieving further efficiency gains is critical because producer prices are unlikely to rise. But additional 
cost reductions will be increasingly difficult. By agreeing to marketing allotments to manage a no-cost 
U.S. sugar policy, American sugar producers effectively gave up their ability to plan to increase production and maximize efficiencies of scale. Modest increases in production are still possible, but 
cannot exceed the rate of consumption growth, less future concessions to foreign exporters to the U.S. 
market.   
 
Future cost reductions will hinge on continued investment for technological gains in the field and 
factory – investment that, in turn, will hinge on the prospect of the continued market stability that U.S. 
sugar policy is designed to provide. 
 
The Consumption Challenge 
 
After the U.S. beverage industry completed its conversion from sugar to corn sweeteners in the mid-
1980’s, sugar consumption rose steadily. From 1987 to 2000, the average annual increase was 160,000 
tons.  In 2001, however, there was no significant increase; consumption fell in 2002 and is expected to 
be down again this year. For 2001-03, the average annual decrease in sugar consumption amounts to 
131,000 tons (Chart 20). 
 
The lost sales are a terrible strain on sugar producers struggling to survive. Furthermore, with domestic 
marketing allotments and mandated minimum levels of imports, it’s U.S., not foreign, producers who 
must absorb the cost of the reduced marketings. And, declining consumption makes it that much more 
difficult to accommodate foreign producers clamoring for increased access to the U.S. market in the 
trade negotiation arena. 
 
The reasons for this extremely disturbing decline in demand are not yet clear. Apparently, a combination 
of factors is at play. Chief among these are slower growth in U.S. per capita income, shifting dietary 
preferences, and increased imports of sugar-containing products. 
 
We are working with USDA analysts to pinpoint the economic sources of the consumption decline and 
with scientific experts at the Sugar Association to address the dietary issues. The challenge is daunting, 
but we are optimistic consumption will resume its long-term rate of growth next year. 
 
Trade Policy Challenges: Near-Term 
 
For sugar, the interrelationship between domestic and trade policy is no less profound that that for 
export crops, and probably even more so.  
 
The Administration’s ability to administer marketing allotments and a no-cost sugar policy hinges on its 
ability to prevent circumvention of the U.S. sugar import quota and to cope with foreign countries’ 
efforts to achieve greater access to the U.S. market through WTO, bilateral, and regional trade 
negotiations.   
 
Previous speakers addressed these trade policy challenges in detail – NAFTA and import-quota 




The U.S. sugar industry has made tremendous strides in reaffirming its position as one of the most 
technologically advanced and cost efficient in the world. Its future hinges on its ability to continue to 
reduce costs and preserve its domestic market.  The challenges are formidable, but the industry appears 
well positioned to address them.  
Chart 1 
U.S Wholesale Refined Sugar Prices,
















































U.S. Raw Sugar Prices, 











































































Data Sources:  USDA, BLS.  Price delivered New York, duty-fee paid.  Annual averages, 1985-2002, adjusted by CPI-U.
Nominal Price
 Chart 3 
19 PERMANENT SUGAR MILL CLOSURES SINCE 1996 
        
BEET CLOSURES  CANE CLOSURES   
Spreckels Sugar, Manteca 
California, 1996 
Ka'u Agribusiness  
Hawaii, 1996 
Amfac Sugar, Kekaha 
Hawaii, 2000 




Amfac Sugar, Lihue 
Hawaii, 2000 




Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar, Paia  
Hawaii, 2000 
Great Lakes Sugar, Fremont 
Ohio, 1996 
Breaux Bridge Sugar 
Louisiana, 1998 
Evan Hall Sugar Cooperative 
Louisiana, 2001 
Holly Sugar, Hereford 
Texas, 1998 
Pioneer Mill Company 
Hawaii, 1999 
Caldwell Sugars Cooperative 
Louisiana, 2001 
Holly Sugar, Tracy 
California, 2000 
Talisman Sugar Company 
Florida, 1999   
Holly Sugar, Woodland 
California, 2000       
Western Sugar, Bayard 
Nebraska, 2002       









U.S. Refined Sugar Sellers:
 Grower-Owned Share Doubles in Four Years
(% of production capacity)
Source: Production capacity estimates from McKeany-Favell Company, Inc.  American Sugar Alliance, February 2003.
















































U.S. Refined Sugar Sellers: 1999 
(Grower Owned in Italics) 
       











  -Thousand      
short tons - 
-%-  -%- 
       
Imperial (3)  2,070  33%  19% 
Domino (3)  1,903  31%  17% 
C & H  800  13%  7% 
U.S. Sugar/United Sugars  625  10%  6% 
Refined Sugars  535  9%  5% 
Florida Crystals  250  4%  2% 
       
Cane Total  6,183    56% 
% Grower Owned  14%     
       
Beet Processors                   
(# of plants)       
United Sugars
1 (7)  2,125  43%  19% 
Amalgamated (4)  950  19%  9% 
Western (6)  500  10%  4% 
Michigan (4)  350  7%  3% 
Holly (WY,CO) (3)  400  8%  4% 
Holly Spreckels (CA) (2)  305  6%  3% 
Monitor  180  4%  2% 
Pacific Northwest  125  3%  1% 
       
Beet Total  4,935    44% 
% Grower Owned  65%     
       
U.S. Total  11,118     
% Grower Owned  37%     
       
1) American Crystal, Minn-Dak, Southern Minnesota 
* Source: McKeany-Flavell Company, Inc.       
American Sugar Alliance, June 2002       
        
Chart 6 
U.S. Refined Sugar Sellers: 2003 
(Grower Owned in Italics) 
       








  -Thousand      
short tons - 
-%-  -%- 
The American Sugar Refining 
Company
1 (5)  2,715  40%  22% 
Imperial (2)  1,600  33%  19% 
C & H  800  14%  8% 
U.S. Sugar/United Sugars  700  12%  7% 
       
Cane Total  5,815    57% 
% Grower Owned  59%     
       
Beet Processors                   
(# of plants)       
United Sugars
2 (7)  1,925  44%  19% 
Snake River Growers/Amalgamated 
(4)  950  22%  9% 
Rocky Mountain Sugar 
Growers/Western (6)  500  11%  5% 
Southern Minnesota/Cargill  360  8%  4% 
Michigan (4)  305  7%  3% 
Imperial/Spreckels (2)  305  7%  3% 
Monitor  180  4%  2% 
Washington Sugar Companys
3  100  2%  1% 
Wyoming  90  2%  1% 
Beet Total  4,355    43% 
% Grower Owned  89%     
       
U.S. Total  10,170     
% Grower Owned  72%     
       
1) Formerly Domino Sugar, Refined Sugar Inc.,and Florida Crystals; Cooperatively owned by Florida Crystals and the 
Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida. 
2) American Crystal and Minn-Dak; American Crystal purchased Sidney, Torrington, & Hereford plants from Imperial in 
2002 and is leasing Torrington to Western; Hereford is not operating. 
3) Formerly Pacific Northwest; Did not operate in 2002/03 
* Source: McKeany-Flavell Company, Inc.       
American Sugar Alliance, February 2003.       
 
 





























U.S. Raw Cane Sugar Prices
Since Start of 1996 Farm Bill



































U.S. Wholesale Refined Beet Sugar Prices
Since Start of 1996 Farm Bill
Source:  USDA.  Wholesale refined beet sugar, Midwest markets.  Monthly average prices October 1996 - January 2003.
 









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Since Start of 1996 Farm Bill:
U.S. Agricultural Exports Declining, Imports Rising




















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Net Farm Income
Direct Government Payments
U.S. Net Farm Income: 
Increasing Share from Government Since 1996
-Billion Dollars-
Source: USDA, February 2003.
$ 54.8 
$ 50.5






















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Direct-Government-Payment Share of U.S. Net Farm Income: 
Sharp Rise Since 1996












1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003E 2004E
Sugar
All Other
Data source:  USDA/FSA, 2/3/03; All commodities net outlays 1991-95: $52.2 billion. Sugar: 1991-99 -- revenues from sugar marketing assessment tax (1991-95 revenues: $101 million); 2000-01 -- value of sugar forfeited to, or 
purchased by, government, plus storage costs; 2002-03 -- revenues from sale of CCC sugar onto market at a profit.
 
1991-2004 Totals
All Other Program Total Net Outlays: $195,057 million
Sugar Total Net Revenues:                 $24 million
Government Net Outlays for Sugar and 
 All Other Commodity Programs, 1996-2004














































Developed Countries' Retail Sugar Prices:
USA 22% Below Average
Source:  LMC International Ltd., Oxford, England, February 2003; 2002 prices.
"Other Developed Countries" represents the weighted average of 21 foreign developed countries.
Cents per pound, refined
 
Chart 14 
U.S. Sugar Consumption: Consumer Expenditures 
$2.4 Billion Lower than at Developed Country Average Price, 2002
Data source: "Retail Prices of Sugar Around the World in 2002, " LMC International Ltd., Oxford, England, February 2003. Weighted average of 
21 foreign developed countries. Assumes U.S. sugar consumption of 10 million short tons.
Expenditures at 
Foreign Developed-Country
Average Retail Price, 
54 Cents/lb:
$10.8 bil U.S. Consumer 
Savings per Year:
$2.4 bil





















































Source:  LMC International Ltd., Oxford, England, February 2003.  Study of  49 countries, accounting for approximately 80% of global sugar consumption; 2002 prices.  Highest in survey: Zimbabwe, 
502 minutes.  Based on 2002 World Bank  per capita GNP data.  *OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES" represents the weighted average of 21 foreign developed countries.
Minutes
Minutes of Work Required to Buy One Pound of Sugar:











































Expenditure on Sugar as % of per capita GNP: USA Lowest in World
Source: LMC International Ltd., Oxford, England, February 2003. Highest in survery: Zimbabwe, 18.49%.  Based on 2002 World Bank per capita GNP data. 
"OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES" repersents the weighted average of 21 foreign developed countries.
Percent of Expenditure on Sugar
 










From 1996 through 2002:  
Farmer Prices for Sugar Fall, 













*2002 annual average price compared with 1996. Raw cane: Duty-fee paid, New York. Wholesale refined beet: Midwest 





































*2002 annual average price compared with 1990.  Raw cane: duty-fee paid, New York.  Wholesale refined beet sugar: Midwest markets.  Retail prices: 
Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price indices.  Data source: USDA.
From 1990 through 2002:
Farmer Prices for Sugar Fall,














































































































Sugar Yield Per Acre, 



































1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
U.S. Sugar Deliveries for Domestic Food Use: 
Change from Previous Year, Fiscal 1987-2003
- Thousand short tons -




1987-2000 Average Increase:  +160,000 tons/year
2001-2003 Average Decrease: -131,000 tons/year
 